

Approved For Release 2002/02/11 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000300010001-6



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**SECRET**

IP-191

12 July 1951

NOTE FOR FILE

This project was referred to State (Dr. M. Ruggles) for evaluation inasmuch as ORR's Psychological Warfare capabilities had terminated.

OPC was given access to the copy and their immediate needs were satisfied.

Inasmuch as State did not feel they wished to publish the material, it was decided to place the original draft on file. State returned it for this purpose.

OPC [REDACTED] was advised of this and agreed, indicating that we would be notified if they had any further interest in the paper. In this event, it would be available to them. This disposition of the paper was approved by AD/RR.

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

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P.S. This paper was turned over to CIA Library on 23 August 1951 for retention. The attached notice was affixed to the document.

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Specifications of Country by Country  
Studies on Physical and  
Psychological Accessibility  
to Psychological Warfare -

Obtained from OAS's files  
13 Feb 53 - to CIA Library  
to be forwarded to my library  
18 Feb 53 for 1 mo. loan

ILLEGIB

App

00010001-6

AD ROUTING SLIP

DATE	FROM	TO
5/1/88	AD/RR	(2)
5/1/88	DAD/RR <i>ss</i>	(1)
	Executive	
	Assistant Executive	
5 July 1988	Special Assistants	
	<i>ss/r</i>	(3)
	Administrative Assistant	

SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_ COMMENT \_\_\_\_\_ INFORMATION ☒  
ACTION \_\_\_\_\_ RETURN \_\_\_\_\_  
REMARKS:

*See note from* [REDACTED]

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TRANSMITTAL		P
3 July 51 DATE		
TO: Mr. Millerkan		
BUILDING	M	ROOM NO. 2106
REMARKS: IP-191 is now on file. We are reporting it as "completed" since OPC has been taken care of. I have not discussed the matter with [redacted] since you agreed to do so. -Coffin		
FROM: [redacted]		
BUILDING	M	ROOM NO. 2216
FORM NO. 36-8 SEP 1946		

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**Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt**



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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:

I/IS

NO.

35558

DATE

3 November 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
Chief, D/Pub, ORE ATTN: [REDACTED]					12-191
2.	25X1A				
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7-1-1977 J. J. Jones  
[Redacted] OPC

STAT

Has no  
objection to putting it  
in library where they  
can consult it without  
further review of us.  
If so, <sup>late</sup> they will advise  
me.

WJm

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FROM:

I/IS

NO.

35668

DATE

15 November 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. Chief, D/FUB.ORE ATTN: [REDACTED]					1P-192
2.	25X1A				
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GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

STAFF STUDY

POPULATION AND AREAS OF SELECTED CITIES  
IN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES

DECEMBER 1950

IP-193-194

NOTICE: WORKING-PAPER No. 7

This document is a working-paper, not an official issuance, since it has not necessarily been coordinated with and reviewed by other components of O/RR. It represents the formulative thinking of one group of analysts in O/RR and is designed to provide the medium for transmitting their informal views to other intelligence analysts of the US Government who are working on similar or overlapping problems. It is intended for the use of the addressee alone, and not for further dissemination.

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POPULATION AND AREAS OF SELECTED CITIES IN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE  
SATELLITE COUNTRIES

Information on the population and area of the 44 principal cities within the present boundaries of the U.S.S.R. and of the five principal cities in Poland is presented in the three accompanying tables. It was impossible to select the 25 largest cities in the U.S.S.R. (as requested) because of the inadequacy of available postwar population statistics. Statistics for the five largest cities of Poland and Czechoslovakia, however, are both reliable and recent. For the other satellite countries population data, in general, are good but the data on areas are inadequate.

Table 1 lists the 27 cities in the U.S.S.R. that had a population of 280,000 or more in 1939, plus those cities east of the Urals and the Caspian Sea whose postwar population is estimated to exceed 300,000 (including Samarkand whose postwar population is estimated to fall within the category 250,000-500,000). The only exact population data available for the U.S.S.R. are those in the 1939 Soviet census and the latest prewar censuses of Poland and Latvia. In all other sources, population figures are estimates derived from various sources. Probably the best estimates (though still of limited value) are those based on adjusted Soviet election returns (Table 1, column 2). Other estimates included were: (1) prepared for NIS 26 and JANIS 40 and 41 (columns 4 and 5), (2) based on the broad population categories shown on a 1947 Soviet map (column 6), and (3) taken from various sources.

Information on the area of Soviet cities is also inadequate and unsatisfactory. Except for Leningrad and Moscow, the latest and most authoritative comparable data are those presented in an official 1927 Soviet source. No other source provides figures on the official area of cities or official estimates of built-up portions of the cities. The figures in columns 10, 11, 12, are estimates based on sources that are

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neither uniform nor comparable. The estimates in column 10 are particularly weak because Soviet town plans or mosaics seldom show official city limits, though they may show built-up areas. Comparison, therefore, cannot be made between data presented in columns 8 and 10. The information on built-up areas in columns 9 and 10 is most satisfactory for those cities for which airphotos are available. All of these cities lie west of the Leningrad-Moscow-Stalingrad line. There is an unexplainable anomaly between the 1926 figures on built-up areas in column 9 and the ESID estimates in columns 11 and 12 for several cities.

Population data for Polish cities given in Table 2 are taken from the 1946 Polish Census and the 1949 registration. Later information from the new census scheduled for December 1950 may become available in 1951. City area data are taken from an official Polish postwar source. The population and area figures for Polish cities are particularly valuable since the territorial-administrative boundaries on which they are based are both definite and relatively stable. Consequently, the 1946 and 1949 figures are comparable.

Table 3 presents population and area data for the other satellite countries. Where an official figure for the area of the census unit was available, an attempt was made to calculate the amount of this area that is truly urban.

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The results cannot be considered definitive. The approximate population of the urban section was derived, except for Bucuresti, from third- or fourth-order census breakdown. In the case of Bucuresti, it was based on the prewar urban-rural ratio for the municipiul. The figures for Hungary are unusual in the extraordinarily wide disparity in size between the census unit areas and the actual built-up areas. With the exception of Budapest, sources held in the Geographic Division do not give population data for villages

within the törvényhatósági jogú városok, although the population of even very small villages outside of these units is indicated. Consequently, it has not been possible to estimate the strictly urban population of the other four Hungarian cities.

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 17 November 1950

To: D/MA

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: Compilation of Statistics regarding major cities - USSR and Poland

Statement of Project

25X1 Origin: Internal [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 25X1A

- Problem: a. To furnish statistics on population of 25 major cities in USSR  
b. To furnish statistics on population of important cities in Poland, their area, and a brief word on background as to break-up into suburban areas.

Scope:

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum

Draft due in D/Pub: 27 November 1950

Responsible Division: D/MA

Internal Coordination: As necessary

Departmental responsibilities:

Classification to be no higher than: CONFIDENTIAL

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

AD/RR

D/MA (2) [REDACTED]

O/PC

25X1A

Project: IP-194

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 20 November 1950

To: D/MA

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: Compilation of Statistics regarding five major cities in  
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Albania

Statement of Project

Origin: Inter al

25X1

Problem: To furnish following information:

- a. names of cities
- b. populations (latest estimate)
- c. area in square miles of the urban portions of the cities proper (for Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria only)
- d. any miscellaneous information on the surrounding suburban build-up (i.e. small settlements or towns, etc.)

Scope:

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum

Draft due in D/Pub: 27 November 1950

Responsible Division: D/MA

Internal Coordination: As necessary

Departmental responsibilities:

Classification to be no higher than: CONFIDENTIAL

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project: IP-194

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

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- a. names of cities
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- c. area in square miles of the urban portions of the cities proper (for Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria only)
- d. any miscellaneous information on the surrounding suburban build-up (i.e. small settlements or towns, etc.)

Scope:

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum

Draft due in D/Pub: 27 November 1950

Responsible Division: D/MA

Internal Coordination: As necessary

Departmental responsibilities:

Classification to be no higher than: CONFIDENTIAL

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

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D/MA (2)  
O/PC

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17 November 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR : CHIEF, D/PUB, ORE

ATTENTION : [REDACTED] 25X1A

SUBJECT : Data on cities and their populations within the Soviet Union and the Satellites.

25X1 REFERENCE : [REDACTED]

1. This office has a requirement for the following information on the twenty-five major cities within the USSR and the five major cities within each of the Satellite nations, excluding Eastern Germany:

- a. Names of the cities.
- b. Populations (Latest estimate).
- c. Area in square miles of the urban portions of the cities proper (where available.)
- d. Any miscellaneous information on the surrounding suburban build-up (i.e. small settlements or towns, etc.)

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2. Following a conversation with [REDACTED] of D/Pub, ORE, [REDACTED] has informally cleared this requirement respectively with [REDACTED] of the CIA Map Branch, ORE. [REDACTED] has expressed his willingness to supply the names and populations of the twenty-five major cities in the USSR, but has stated that he cannot provide reliable data on c and d of this requirement. He is further willing to fulfill a, b, c, and d with regard to Poland. [REDACTED] has undertaken to supply such data as is available to her on all four points of the requirement with regard to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Albania. She has stated that reliable information on point c can be provided only in the case of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Both [REDACTED] feel that they can meet our deadline of 27 November 1950, with the finished material.

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3. Questions pertaining to this request may be referred to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
Chief, Intelligence Support

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FROM:

1/15.

NO.

DATE

17 Mar 50.

TO

ROOM  
NO.

DATE

REC'D

FWD'D

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS

1. Ch/D, Pub, ORE

An

2.

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To D/Ma 20 Nov.

To D/Ma 17 Nov

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POPULATION AND AREA OF PRINCIPAL CITIES IN THE U.S.S.R.

City	Location	Official census data 1939	Estimates based on election returns <sup>8</sup> 1949	NIS estimates <sup>9</sup> 1947	JANIS estimates <sup>12</sup> 1946	NIS estimates <sup>14</sup> 1946	Other significant population estimates <sup>7</sup>	Official city area 1926 (?) <sup>15</sup> in square miles	ESID estimates of urban areas <sup>20</sup> in square miles built-up			Other area <sup>21</sup> estimates in square miles	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(in 1,000's)													
1. Alma-Ata	43°16'N 76°56'E	230,528	300,000	230,000				15.7	2.2	45	.7	12.5	
2. Archangel	64°33'N 40°32'E	281,091	300,000	280,000				22	3.1	10.7	1.4	3.1	Approx. 12
3. Baku	40°23'N 49°52'E	809,347	820,000	810,000	770,000	880,000 <sup>13</sup>	900,000 (1950) <sup>25</sup>	35.9	4.8	30	2.8	6.7	13.2 <sup>26</sup>
4. Barnaul	53°20'N 83°48'E	148,129	200,000	150,000		300-500		93.1	4.3	21	2.0	8.8	
5. Chelyabinsk	55°10'N 61°25'E	273,100	550,000	270,000	300,000 <sup>10</sup>	300-500	100,000- 500,000 <sup>24</sup>	18.7	2.4	28.8	1.4	12.7	
6. Chkalov	51°47'N 55°07'E	172,925	200,000	170,000		300-500		112.5	7.3	10	1.1	6.1	
7. Dnepropetrovsk	48°28'N 35°02'E	500,662	540,000	500,000	590,000	600,000	500,000- 1,000,000 <sup>24</sup> 590,000 (1947) <sup>25</sup>	17.3	5.3	99	7.3	30.3	18.0 <sup>26</sup>
8. Gor'kiy	56°19'N 44°00'E	644,116	770,000	645,000	885,000	900,000	500,000- 1,000,000 <sup>24</sup> 885,000 (1947) <sup>25</sup>	14.8	2	43	5.0	13.5	10 32.6 <sup>26</sup>
9. Irkutsk	52°17'N 104°18'E	243,380	240,000	240,000		over 500	100,000- 500,000 <sup>24</sup>	66.4	7.0	16	1.0	9.3	
10. Ivanovo	57°00'N 41°00'E	285,060	300,000	285,000				14.4	4.7	14	1.5	7.7	
11. Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg)	54°42'N 20°31'E	368,433 <sup>2</sup>					500,000 <sup>3</sup>						
12. Karaganda	49°52'N 73°10'E	165,937	250,000	165,000		300-500		ND	ND <sup>16</sup>				
13. Kazan'	55°47'N 49°08'E	401,665	450,000	400,000			436,000 (1943) <sup>25</sup>	26	7.6	36	5.0	7.6	35 8.6 <sup>26</sup>
14. Kemerovo	55°21'N 86°04'E	132,978	240,000	130,000	875,000	990,000	300-500	12	1.3	13.6	1.0	5.4	
15. Khar'kov	49°58'N 36°15'E	833,432	800,000	830,000				54.3	16.1	27.5	3.5	20.6	22
16. Kiev	50°27'N 30°30'E	846,293	900,000	850,000	880,000	650,000	500,000- 1,000,000 <sup>24</sup>	156.8	64.5	62	2.3	23.3	
17. Krasnoyarsk	56°01'N 92°50'E	189,999	240,000	190,000		300-500		57.8	3.5	17	3.0	5.4	
18. Kuybyshev	53°12'N 50°06'E	390,267	600,000	390,000		600,000	100,000- 500,000 <sup>24</sup> 600,000 (1945) <sup>25</sup>	103.9	5.8	53	9.6	16.9	44 9.9 <sup>26</sup>
19. Leningrad	59°56'N 30°20'E	3,191,304	3,300,000	3,190,000	3,100,000	2,800,000	Metro. Area 3,000,000 <sup>25</sup>	121.2 <sup>17</sup>	41.4	66.4	15.0	20.0	23 <sup>22</sup> 47.6 <sup>26</sup>
20. L'vov	49°51'N 24°02'E	312,200 <sup>4</sup>					317,000 <sup>5</sup> (1947) <sup>25</sup>	25.9 <sup>4</sup>					21.6 11.5 <sup>26</sup>
							100,000- 500,000 <sup>24</sup> 430,000 (1949) <sup>25</sup>						
21. Magnitogorsk	53°24'N 59°05'E	145,870	200,000	145,000		300-500		ND	ND	28	5.8	6.2	
22. Molotov	58°00'N 56°13'E	255,196	500,000	255,000		300-500		45.9	2.6	27	4.1	12.0	
23. Moscow	55°45'N 37°37'E	4,137,018	5,050,000	4,140,000	4,350,000	4,500,000	4,700,000 (1950) <sup>25</sup>	110 <sup>18</sup>	ND	98.8	14.0	44.0	81.2 <sup>26</sup>
24. Nizhny Tagil	57°55'N 59°57'E	159,864	200,000	160,000		300-500		20.8	ND	71	9.0	23.4	
25. Novosibirsk	55°02'N 82°56'E	405,589	700,000	405,000	725,000 750,000 <sup>10</sup>	over 500	500,000- 1,000,000 <sup>24</sup>	36.8	3.1	49	6.5	13.5	

1. Soviet census of 1939, unless otherwise noted.
2. German census of 1939.
3. *Izvestiya*, 6 November 1946.
4. Polish census of 1931.
5. Soviet source; information as of 1 January 1938.
6. Department of State, OIR Report No. 5054.1, First Preliminary Version, 23 September 1949.
7. Latvian census of 1935.
8. ES-Q/RR accepted estimate based on 1949 Soviet election returns. The 1939 election returns, from German sources, are provided for purposes of comparison.
9. NIS 26, Section 41 (Department of State), unless otherwise noted.
10. NIS 26 - III, Section 25 (Engineer Strategic Int. Division, Army Map Service, based on POW interrogations, from Soviet technical representatives, etc.).
11. NIS 26 - II, Section 25, *ibid*.
12. JANIS 40, Chapter VIII unless otherwise noted.
13. JANIS 41, Chapter VIII.
14. From city symbols classified according to population categories on a 1947 Soviet map.
15. From an official Soviet source dated 1927; date of data unspecified, but believed to be about 1926.
16. ND - no data.
17. Soviet source dated 1937.
18. Soviet source dated 1938.
19. Parenthesis indicate either an approximate value or a Soviet official reservation concerning accuracy.
20. Based on estimates prepared by Engineer Strategic Intelligence Division, Army Map Service. Values were obtained by planimeter measurement of built-up areas as shown on town plans prepared for NIS 26 and for Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) studies of the Far East Command. The plans were compiled from a variety of sources of various dates, including other town plans, maps, aerial photographs, and intelligence information.
21. Prepared for JANIS 40, unless otherwise noted.
22. Built-up areas only.
23. Registered voters in 1947, SO 5091 dated 20 May 1947.
24. From city symbols classified according to population categories in excess of 500,000 as shown on a 1949 Soviet map.
25. Estimates of Air Research Section, Air Studies Division of the Library of Congress.
26. Total zoned urban area (residential, industrial, etc.), estimated by Air Research Section, Air Studies Division of the Library of Congress.

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City	Location	Official census data <sup>1</sup> 1939 (1)	Estimate based on election returns <sup>8</sup> 1949 (2)	1939 (3)	NIS estimates <sup>9</sup> 1947 (4)	JANIS estimates <sup>12</sup> 1946 (5)	NIS estimates <sup>14</sup> 1946 (6) (in 1,000's)	Other significant population estimates <sup>7</sup> (7)	Official city area 1926 (?) <sup>15</sup> in square miles total built-up (8) (9)	ESID estimates of urban areas <sup>20</sup> in square miles built-up total (10)	in square miles industrial (11)	residential (12)	Other areas estimates <sup>21</sup> in square miles (13)
26. Odessa	46°28'N 30°44'E	604,223	550,000	605,000	680,000			6,000,000 (1949) <sup>25</sup>	271.4 28.7	12.0	1.0	7.8	19 16.5 <sup>26</sup>
27. Omsk	55°00'N 73°23'E	280,716	600,000	280,000			300-500	100,000- 500,000 <sup>24</sup>	47.7 3.6	36	5.3	12.8	
28. Prokop'yevsk	53°52'N 86°45'E	107,227	250,000	110,000			300-500						
29. Riga	56°59'N 24°09'E	385,063 <sup>7</sup>				480,000		322,834 <sup>23</sup> 350,000 (1949) <sup>25</sup>					20.5 <sup>26</sup>
30. Rostov-on-Don	47°14'N 39°42'E	510,253	600,000	570,000	580,000			500,000 (1949) <sup>25</sup>	42.4 3.9	31	3.0	18.4	55 15.1 <sup>26</sup>
31. Samarkand	39°39'N 66°59'E	134,346					250-500	300,000 (1946) <sup>11</sup>	(15.1) <sup>19</sup> (4.5)	3	ND	2.0	
32. Saratov	51°32'N 46°01'E	375,860	600,000	375,000				100,000- 500,000 <sup>24</sup> 450,000 (1949) <sup>25</sup>	92.9 8.9	11.7	2.3	6.5	17.4 <sup>26</sup>
33. Semipalatinsk	50°25'N 80°16'E	109,779					300-500		49.8 4.4				
34. Stalingrad	48°42'N 44°30'E	445,476	320,000	445,000	440,000	300,000		100,000- 500,000 <sup>24</sup>	41.6 6.6	26	3.4	4.5	Approx. 95
35. Stalino	47°07'N 37°50'E	462,395	450,000	460,000	485,000			100,000- 500,000 <sup>24</sup>	2.5 ND	34	2.3	22.9	
36. Stalinsk	53°45'N 87°07'E	169,538	250,000	170,000			300-500	223,000- (1945) <sup>10</sup>	19.9 0.04	9.0	0.7	4.0	
37. Sverdlovsk	56°50'N 60°36'E	425,544	600,000	425,000	585,000 500,000 <sup>10</sup>		300-500	100,000- 500,000 <sup>24</sup>	29.9 5.6	45	2.7	20.6	
38. Tashkent	41°19'N 69°20'E	585,005	570,000	585,000	590,000 <sup>11</sup> 600,000			800,000 (1948) <sup>10</sup>	(77.3) (26.6)	42	3.0	15.6	
39. Tiflis (Tbilisi)	41°43'N 44°49'E	519,175	600,000	520,000	490,000			500,000- 1,000,000 <sup>21</sup>	(11.9) (6)	12.4	1.6	8.1	
40. Tomsk	56°29'N 84°59'E	141,215					300-500		41 4.2	8.0	1.0	5.5	
41. Ufa	54°43'N 55°56'E	245,863	230,000	245,000			300-500	330,000 (1942) <sup>25</sup>	76.8 7.2	14.5	3.0	9.0	12.6 <sup>26</sup>
42. Voronezh	51°40'N 39°12'E	326,836	300,000	325,000					18.9 6.2	6.5	1.0	5.0	
43. Yaroslavl'	57°38'N 39°53'E	298,065	300,000	300,000		300,000			21.8 6.3	24	5.4	8.6	
44. Zaporozh'ye	47°50'N 35°08'E	289,188	320,000	290,000					3.2 2.5	60	5.0	21.0	49

TABLE 2  
Approved For Release 2002/02/11 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000300010001-6  
POPULATION AND AREA OF THE FIVE LARGEST CITIES IN POLAND  
1946-1949

City	Location	Population	Registered, 1 January 1949			Area <sup>3</sup>
		Census of 1 January 1946	Resident	Transient	Total	Sq. mi.
1. Kraków	50°04'N 19°56'E	299,396	285,528	21,864	307,392	63.7
2. Łódź	51°45'N 18°58'E	496,929	532,045	68,563	600,608	81.9
Central district <sup>2</sup>		327,200				13.5
Northern district		118,400				43.7
Southern district		51,300				24.7
3. Poznań	52°24'N 16°55'E	267,978	258,347	47,388	305,735	87.3
4. Warszawa (Warsaw)	52°13'N 21°01'E	478,755	578,046	28,732	606,778	54.4
Central district		137,600				8.1
Northern district		35,900				5.7
Western district		46,100				6.6
Southern district		58,700				14.7 <sub>1</sub>
Southern Praga district		104,400				8.9 <sub>1</sub>
Northern Praga district		96,100				7.7 <sub>1</sub>
5. Breslau (Wrocław)	51°05'N 17°03'E	107,656	256,498	45,814	302,312	67.6

1. Not including the area of the Vistula River (2.7 sq. mi.).

2. Powiat miejski - urban district.

3. Based on official data of the Główny Urząd Pomiarów Kraju (Chief Adm. of National Surveys).

CONFIDENTIAL

MAJOR CITIES OF THE OTHER SATELLITE COUNTRIES -- POPULATION AND AREA<sup>1</sup>

City	Location (1)	Population (2)	Source of (2) (3)	Name of census unit to which (2) applies (4)	Area of census unit to which (2) applies (sq. miles) (5)	Approximate total con- tinuous built- up area (sq. miles) (6)	Source of (7) (7)	Approx. population of total continuous built-up area (8)
ALBANIA								
Tirane	41°20'N 19°43'E	59,887	Census 30 Sep 1945	unknown	unknown	15		
Shkodër	42 04 19 30	33,852	Census 30 Sep 1945	unknown	unknown			
Korçë	40 37 20 47	24,035	Census 30 Sep 1945	unknown	unknown			
Elbasan	41 06 20 03	14,968	Census 30 Sep 1945	unknown	unknown			
Vlorë	40 29 19 29	14,640	Census 30 Sep 1945	unknown	unknown			
BULGARIA								
Sofiya	42 40 23 18	434,888	Census 31 Dec 1946	obshchina	unknown	15	Airphoto 1943	410,000
Sofiya		366,925	Census 31 Dec 1946	grad	unknown			
Plovdiv	42 08 24 45	125,440	Census 31 Dec 1946	grad	unknown			
Varna	43 13 27 55	77,792	Census 31 Dec 1946	grad	unknown			
Ruse	43 50 25 57	53,420	Census 31 Dec 1946	grad	unknown			
Burgas	42 30 27 30	43,684	Census 31 Dec 1946	grad	unknown			

Except in the case of Sofiya, available maps and airphotos do not indicate contiguous suburbs not included in the urban figures. In most cases, there are few scattered rural households around the cities. Population figures given above presumably refer primarily to the continuous built-up urban area.

1. Classification applies to source only.
2. No basis for estimate.

City	Location (1)		Population (2)	Source of (2) (3)	Name of census unit to which (2) applies (4)	Area of census unit to which (2) applies (sq. miles) (5)	Approximate total continuous built-up area (sq. miles) (6)	Source of (7) (7)	Approx. population of total continuous built-up area (8)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA									
Praha	50°05'N	14°28'E	922,284	Census 22 May 1947	hlavní město	66	35	1:100,000 map 1944	900,000
Brno	49 12	16 38	273,127	Census 22 May 1947	zemské hlavní město	54	8	City plan c. - 1947	225,000
Brno			133,637	Census 22 May 1947	město	7			
Ostrava	49 50	18 17	180,960	Census 22 May 1947	statutární město	48	9	1:100,000 map 1944	140,000
Bratislava	48 09	17 07	184,423	Census 1948	zemské hlavní město	73			
Plzeň	49 45	13 22	117,814	Census 22 May 1947	statutární město	33	4	City plan 1943	105,000
HUNGARY									
Budapest	47 30	19 05	1,058,288	Census Dec 1948	t.h.j. város	30	50	City plan 1943	1,440,000
Szeged	46 15	20 11	132,688	Census 1949	t.h.j. város	315	5	City plan c. - 1947	2
Debrecen	47 32	21 38	125,933	Census 1941	t.h.j. város	370	9	Target chart 1944	2
Miskolc	48 06	20 48	109,433	Census 1941	t.h.j. város	73	4	Airphoto 1944	2
Kecskemét	46 52	19 42	87,269	Census 1941	t.h.j. város	362			
ROMANIA									
București	46 08	22 54	1,041,807	Census 25 Jan 1948	municipiul	120	23	City plan 1938	900,000
Cluj	46 44	23 33	117,915	Census 25 Jan 1948	municipiul	unknown			
Timișoara	45 47	21 13	111,987	Census 25 Jan 1948	municipiul	unknown			
Ploști	44 57	26 02	95,632	Census 25 Jan 1948	municipiul	unknown			
Brăila	45 16	27 59	95,514	Census 25 Jan 1948	municipiul	unknown			

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**Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt**



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FROM:

*F/15.*

NO.

DATE

*9 Nov. 50.*

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. <i>Ch, D/Pub. OFF.</i>					<div data-bbox="964 596 1240 785" data-label="Text"> <p><i>24 NOV decided</i></p> </div> <div data-bbox="688 963 1346 1415" data-label="Text"> <p><b>EXPEDITE</b></p> </div>
2. <i>[Redacted]</i>					
25X1A					
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**Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

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Approved For Release 2002/02/11 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000300010001-6

25X6

**Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT:

DATE: 18 Dec.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

[redacted] expressed pleasure and satisfaction with the way this project had been taken of. He asked that a similar one be done for [redacted] E.W. forgot to take this up immediately with D/LA, and on 15 Dec John called to find out the status. On checking on 18 Dec. it was discovered by EW that she had done nothing on initiating the project, but [redacted] very kindly checked with analysts and [redacted] to see what could be done. In view of the fact that D/LA is already working on a project [redacted] which is of high priority, and also in view of the fact that [redacted] (D/LA) had given to [redacted] (OPC) material containing necessary references 25X1A they felt project could not be handled at this time. On transmitting this information to John, he said material did not contain desired references and withdrew request, hoping later on to define the request in clearer terms at a later date. It was his wish that work should not be interrupted by the higher priority request in order to take care of this one. All this [redacted] was relayed back to [redacted] 25X1A

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Approved For Release 2002/02/11 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000300010001-6

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2002/02/11 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000300010001-6

Project: 1P-197

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 29 Nov 50

To: D/FE

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: Chinese Communist Party

Statement of Project

25X1A

Origin: Internal

Problem: To furnish estimate of degree of influence

Scope: exerted by nationalist elements in CCP

Graphics (if any): -

Form: Memorandum

Draft due in D/Pub: about 15 Dec. 1950

Dissemination deadline  
(if any):

Responsible Division: D/FE

Internal Coordination: D/EE-8

Departmental responsibilities:

Classification to be no higher than: SECRET

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

AD/RR  
D/FE  
D/FE (3)

File

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2002/02/11 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000300010001-6

**CONFIDENTIAL**

27 November 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, D/PUB, ORR

ATTENTION

:

25X1A

SUBJECT

:

Chinese Communist Party

REFERENCE

:

25X1A

1. It is requested that you supply this office with an estimate of the degree of influence exerted by nationalist elements in the Chinese Communist Party.

2. Questions pertinent to this request may be directed to [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

[REDACTED]  
Acting Chief, Intelligence Support Branch

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# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:

I/IS

NO.

DATE

27 November 1950

TO

ROOM  
NO.

DATE

REC'D

FWD'D

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS

1. Chief, D/Pub, ORR  
ATTN: [REDACTED]

D/CE

11/28/50

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1P-197

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**SECRET**

PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

Editorial Review

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
2. \_\_\_\_\_  
3. \_\_\_\_\_

Note: This cover sheet must accompany the draft under review at all times within D/Pub. When the draft is returned to the producing division, the date will be recorded, proper entry made in the log, and the cover sheet and attachments returned to the file. When the draft is again received in D/Pub, the cover sheet will be attached with notation of the date on it and in the log. The Coordination and Production Branch should be advised of the above transactions.

No drafts should be accepted by the Editors without an Editorial Review cover sheet.

Editors will ordinarily advise the producing division of the results of their initial review within 48 hours of receipt of the draft.

Project: IP-197

Received from: B/FEP, D/Rgl

Subject: Nationalist Elements in the  
Chinese Communist Party

Date: 4 January 1951

Deadline for editing:

Remarks:

Reviewed in D/Pub by: \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

(1) \_\_\_\_\_ (2) \_\_\_\_\_ (3) \_\_\_\_\_

Returned to Division: \_\_\_\_\_  
Received in D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_

Results of initial review communicated to  
Division:

Returned to Division: \_\_\_\_\_  
Received in D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Time: \_\_\_\_\_ By: \_\_\_\_\_

Summary of Initial Review (use reverse side if necessary):

Final Draft approved by Division: \_\_\_\_\_ D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Chief, D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Final Revision (after coordination) approved by

Division: \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinator: \_\_\_\_\_ D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Cover sheet, attachments, editorial comments and edited draft will be returned to file upon completion of project.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

Not Approved For Release 2002/02/11 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000300010001-6 conform to the classification of the draft it covers.

Date 4 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Transmission of Draft Report

ENCLOSURE: IP-197 - Nationalist Elements in the Chinese Communist Party

(3 copies)

1. Enclosure is forwarded herewith for review and, if required, for formal coordination with the departmental intelligence organizations.

2. This draft report has been coordinated informally with the organizations checked below:

Within CIA:

D/CI	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/HC	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/IE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/LA	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/IR	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/NE	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/IS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	D/PA	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/FE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/PC	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/NE	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

Outside CIA: None

State (OIR)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Army (ID/GEUSA)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Navy (ONI)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Air (AID)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

3. Maps and/or Graphics to be included in this report and arrangements completed for their production by the Map Division or the Presentation Staff are as follows:

None



None



25X1A

Division B/FEP, D/Rgl

**SECRET**

4 January 1951

IP - 197

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Party

A. Influence of Nationalist Communist Elements

1. The Politburo

It is often alleged that there is a split in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo, in which three principal factions are said to be represented: (a) the Stalinist faction, led by Party theoretician LIU Shao-ch'i; (b) the pro-Soviet but non-Stalinist, led by CCP Chairman MAO Tse-tung; and (c) the anti-Stalinist and pro-Western, led by Premier and Foreign Minister CHOU En-lai. Such a split is theoretically possible, in view of the CCP's historical freedom from direct Soviet control, but there is wide disagreement reflected in intelligence reports as to whether such a split in fact exists. There is no reliable evidence of such a split in the Politburo. So far as is known, Chairman MAO's leadership has never been threatened either by internal Party controversies or by major defections; the last dispute of importance dates back to the period of 1927-30, after which time the militant line of LI Li-san\* was discredited and the success of MAO Tse-tung's program led to his confirmation as the undisputed Party leader. MAO has proclaimed himself to be, and has certainly conducted himself as an orthodox Stalinist, and there is no reason to believe that he has been insincere in that role. Neither are there reasonable grounds for believing that LIU Shao-ch'i, the Party's number two man, is prepared to challenge MAO's leadership with a more aggressive program; the published programs of MAO and LIU are identical, and it noted that LIU invariably credits MAO with originating the Party line. CHOU En-lai's reputation as 'pro-Western' derives primarily from his affability in contacts

\* LI Li-san was restored to the Central Committee, after 14 years of 're-education' in the USSR, in 1945. LI is now a leader in the field of labor, but does not appear to be at the top of the CCP hierarchy.

with US representatives during and just after World War II; CHOU's alleged anti-Stalinism has never been apparent in Party policy, and the fact that CHOU continues as Premier and Foreign Minister would suggest an absence of such sentiments. Of the other 10 members of the Politburo, eight are regarded as confirmed or highly probable Stalinists, and there is no reliable evidence of the purported anti-Stalinism of either CHU Teh or TUNG Pi-wu. In any case, whether there is or is not a significant difference of opinion in regard to major Party policies among the members of the Politburo, the Politburo as a body is committed to a solidly Stalinist position.

## 2. Leaders below Politburo level

Too little is known about many of the members of the Central Committee, as individuals, to permit a confident judgment as to the orientation of those persons. However, the Central Committee as a body is clearly dominated, in action, by the Stalinists. Of the Central Committee's six regional bureaus, the Secretaries of four are confirmed or probable Stalinists, and the two doubtful Secretaries are supported by Stalinist under-Secretaries who are probably capable of preventing deviations from the Stalinist line. Those Central Committee members most frequently reported as actually or potentially anti-Stalinist are military leaders; every one of the major field commanders has repeatedly been reported as anti-Stalinist. The non-military leaders have introduced a Stalinist political apparatus between the commanders and their troops in an attempt to ensure their fidelity to the Politburo; this effort is probably not sufficiently advanced to permit the Politburo to forestall a revolt by any major field commander, and the military leaders, in consequence of their various commands, appear to be in a fairly strong position. However, the present state of international hostilities is expected to permit the Politburo to retain the

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unquestioned loyalty of the military. Further, there is no known evidence that these leaders exert any restraining influence upon the Stalinists in the formulation of basic Party policies.

### 3. The Rank-and-File

The proportion of nationalist, and actually or potentially anti-Stalinist, sentiment in the CCP undoubtedly increases from the higher to the lower echelons. Whereas the Politburo appears to be solidly Stalinist, and the lesser leaders predominantly Stalinist, the Party rank-and-file have probably been impelled primarily by nationalist sentiment and are still ambivalent in attitude. There appears to be a wide gap between the Party leadership and the Party masses in regard to their relative awareness of the obligations of "proletarian internationalism," i.e., the kind and degree of subservience to the USSR which will be demanded of Communist China and the CCP. It is known that the bulk of the CCP membership lacks general education, is poorly trained in Marxism, and is bound more by nationalist aspirations than by conscious enthusiasm for the international Communist cause; non-Communist observers have estimated that less than 10% of the CCP's claimed membership of 5,000,000 can be regarded as convinced and orthodox Stalinist Communists, while the remainder are either opportunists ("careerists") or essentially nationalist-minded Chinese who have been deluded by the nationalist pretensions of the Party leadership. However, the CCP high command is well aware of this circumstance, and is making a strenuous effort to indoctrinate the rank-and-file with the tenets of Stalinism and to purge from the Party those opportunists and irreconcilables who have been exposed by, or disaffected as a result of, the increasingly overt and aggressive Stalinist program of the Party leadership. Moreover, the lower echelons have no influence upon the leadership in

the formulation of Party policies; on the contrary, their tenure as members depends upon the alacrity and precision with which they implement those policies.

## B. Future Influence of Nationalist Elements

### 1. Probable Developments

It appears probable that the general purge of the CCP, which has been in process throughout 1950 and which may have been developing rapidly in the past five months, will not extend into the Politburo itself, and that minor differences of opinion in that body will continue to be resolved without violence, in order that the Politburo may continue indefinitely to present an unruffled surface to the non-Communist world. It also seems unlikely that any one of the major military leaders of the regime will be purged from the Party or will revolt against the Stalinist leadership in the near future. The immediate military concerns of nationalist-minded leaders will reduce their capability for offering effective opposition, and these military leaders, like Communist functionaries at all levels, are expected to be increasingly united by the Peiping regime's preparations for expanded or general hostilities. It is probably that the Party masses, through the processes of indoctrination and repeated purges, will increasingly become the relatively efficient instruments of the Stalinist leadership; the turnover in Party ranks may be high, and the casualties be many, but there is a steadily diminishing prospect for a nationalist movement to develop in the Party ranks in opposition to the program of the high command. At the same time increasing Soviet control over the CCP—through the advisory activity of Soviet nationals and the actual penetration of the CCP by Moscow-trained Chinese—is likely to reduce to insignificance the CCP's capabilities for independent action, even in the event that the present CCP leadership should begin to regret its subservience to Moscow.

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## 2. Possible Developments

The possibility exists, but is remote, that Chairman MAO and his Politburo comrades will alter their orientation and attempt to assert their independence. It is also most improbable that any dissident member of the Politburo will significantly affect that body's policies; the result of a sustained effort to do so would almost certainly be the elimination (from the Politburo, if not from life) of the disaffected member, and it is possible that one or more of the present members will be purged in the next few years. There is a strong possibility that a number of lesser leaders, including one or more of the regional Secretaries and major field commanders, will fall from favor or will set up in opposition to the Party leadership; in either case, the Party leadership could be expected to prevail. There are the further possibilities that nationalist sentiment in the Party masses will prove so strong as to prevent their transformation into instruments of Stalinism, and that Soviet infiltration into the CCP will at some point be halted or even reversed; the first of these possibilities is negligible, and the second will remain slight so long as the CCP regards its principal task as that of preparing for the "final conflict" with the West.

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Project: *IP-198*

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: *29 Nov 1950*

To: *D/F2*

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: *Currency Situation in Korea*

Statement of Project

25X1 Origin: *Internal*

Problem: *To prepare statement on currency situation in Korea*

Scope: *To include:*

- a. Status of currency in North and South Korea prior to 25 June 1950*
- b. Status of currency in South Korea prior to 15 September 1950*
- c. Korean currency situation since 15 September*

Graphics (if any): *—*

Form: *Memorandum*

Draft due to D/F2: *About 15 Dec. 1950*

Dissemination deadline  
(if any)

Responsible Division: *D (F2)*

Internal Coordination: *—*

Departmental responsibilities: *—*

Classification to be no higher than: *~~CONF~~ SECRET*

Recommended Dissemination: *Requester only*

*AD/RR  
D/F2 (3)  
C/PC*

*25X1A*

*R/L*

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22 November 1950

ILLEGIB

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, D/PUB, ORR

ATTENTION :

REFERENCE :

25X1

25X1A

1. Pursuant to a conversation of 10 November between [REDACTED] of this office, and [REDACTED] of ORR, it is requested that a memorandum be prepared on the currency situation in Korea which will include the following information:

25X1A

- a. Status of currency in North and South Korea prior to June 25, 1950
  - (1) Type of notes and specie in circulation
  - (2) Amount of currency in circulation in North and South Korea
  - (3) Reserves of gold and foreign exchange in central banks of North and South Korea both at home and abroad
  - (4) Evacuation of gold and foreign exchange reserves from Bank of Korea by ROK forces

- b. Status of currency in South Korea prior to September 15, 1950
  - (1) North Korean capture of currency plates, bank deposits, etc. in South Korea
  - (2) North Korean fiscal policy in occupied South Korea
  - (3) United Nations counter measures to North Korean currency policies

- c. The Korean currency situation since September 15
  - (1) United Nations fiscal policy in North and South Korea

2. For your information, [REDACTED] of this office, on extension 3215, is familiar with this request.

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FREE

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FROM:

I/IS

NO.

36181

DATE

22 November 1950

COMMENTS

TO

ROOM  
NO.

DATE

REC'D

FWD'D

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

1. Chief, D/PUB, ORR  
ATTN: [REDACTED]

D/FE

11/26/50

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COPIATIONS DIVISION

Editorial Review

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No drafts should be accepted by the Editors without an Editorial Review cover sheet.

Editors will ordinarily advise the producing division of the results of their initial review within 48 hours of receipt of the draft.

Project: IP-198

Received from: B/FEP

Subject: Korean Currency

Date: 10 January 1951

Deadline for editing:

Remarks:

Reviewed in D/Pub by:

(1) \_\_\_\_\_ (2) \_\_\_\_\_ (3) \_\_\_\_\_

Returned to Division: \_\_\_\_\_

Received in D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_

Results of initial review communicated to Division:

Returned to Division: \_\_\_\_\_

Received in D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Time: \_\_\_\_\_ By: \_\_\_\_\_

Summary of Initial Review (use reverse side if necessary):

Final Draft approved by Division: \_\_\_\_\_ D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Chief, D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Final Revision (after coordination) approved by

Division: \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinator: \_\_\_\_\_ D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Cover sheet, attachments, editorial comments and edited draft will be returned to file upon completion of project.

Approved For Release 2002/02/11 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000300010001-6

Date 10 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Transmission of Draft Report

ENCLOSURE: IP-198 Korean Currency

(3 copies)

1. Enclosure is forwarded herewith for review and, if required, for formal coordination with the departmental intelligence organizations.

2. This draft report has been coordinated informally with the organizations checked below:

Within CIA: None

D/GI	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/In	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/IA	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/Tr	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/WE	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/EE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/Me	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/FE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/EC	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/NE	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

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State (OIR)	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Other	<input type="checkbox"/>


3. Maps and/or Graphics to be included in this report and arrangements completed for their production by the Map Division or the Presentation Staff are as follows:

None

4. ~~Comments:~~

None

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Acting Chief

Division B/FEP

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IP-196 Korean Currency

I. Status of Currency Prior to 25 June 1950

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A. South Korea

The South Korean fiscal situation since the end of World War II may best be characterized as one of continuous and increasing inflation. For example, according to Korean sources, retail prices (base year 1936 - 100) had risen only 124 points by 1944. However, by 1946 the index had skyrocketed to 22,300 and by December, 1948 had reached 62,900. Official US records, using a base year of 1947 - 100 as an index of wholesale prices, indicate a rise to 319 by January, 1950. The situation continued to deteriorate until partially halted by restrictive measures in May, 1950.

Bank of Korea note issues during the post-war years were as follows (in billions of Won): Dec 1945 - 8.9; Dec 1946 - 17.7; Dec 1947 - 33.4; Dec 1948 - 43.4; Dec 1949 - 75.1; Jan 1950 - 70.9; and June 10, 1950 - 55.7. In June, 1950 South Korea's national income was estimated by South Korean government officials to be about SK Won 933 billion.

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The proposed South Korean National Budget for Fiscal Year 1950 - 1951 was a balanced one. Expenditures of South Korean Won 316,856 million were to be met by taxes and revenue of government monopolies and businesses. The achievement of a balanced budget - at least on paper - represented a considerable victory for US economic advisors, whose task had been made more difficult by an apparent failure of the government to recognize the dangers inherent in deficit financing. The government overdraft with the Bank of Chosun (a central bank) rose steadily in the post war years under both the US Military and ROK governments: Jan 1946 - SK Won 590 million; October 1946 - SK Won 5,219 million; Oct 1947 - 19,859 million; July 1948 - 21,573; Oct 1948 (the last fiscal period of US Military Government responsibility) - 38,400 million; Jan 1949 - 40,732 million; July 1949 - 61,305 million; Dec 1949 - 86,477 million; and June 1950 - 92,300 million.

A further illustration of the course of inflation in South Korea is the rate of exchange between the South Korean Won and the US Dollar shown in the following table:

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Period	Legal Rate	Open Market
1945	15	
1946	15	
Mar 1947	15	
Dec 1947	50	
Sept 1948	50	1,000
Dec 1948	450	1,088
July 1949	450	1,750
Dec 1949	600	3,000
Jan 1950	800	4,400
June 1950	1,600	2,040

South Korean currency prior to June 1950 was issued in 1, 5, 10, and 100 won notes. However, because of the effects of inflation, notes under 100 won had become practically worthless.

#### B. North Korea

Confirmed information is still generally lacking concerning fiscal matters in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea) prior to the June invasion of South Korea. Available information suggests that currency in circulation early in 1950 was not in excess of NK Won 10 billion. Purchasing power is estimated at NK Won 35 billion. The stability of the North Korean fiscal system was maintained by rigid economic controls. The North Korean annual budget (the only freely-publicized North Korean fiscal information) showed a surplus in 1948, when income of NK Won 16 billion

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exceeded expenditures of NK Won 14 billion. The budget for 1949 was a perfectly balanced one, according to North Korean statements with income of NK Won 19 billion equaling expenditures. A budgetary deficit anticipated in 1950 was to be offset by a bond issue of NK Won 1.5 billion. Income in 1950 was scheduled at NK Won 25 billion with expenditures at NK Won 26 billion. The bond issue, floated in May, was over-subscribed by NK Won 1 billion within a week of its issue. [REDACTED] 25X1C

the military were to receive some 35% of expenditures in 1950.

Complete information on the denominations of the notes issued by the North Korean government is lacking. In May of 1949, however, the North Korean government withdrew small denomination notes and coins valued at 5, 10, 20 and 50 chon and replaced them with USSR-minted coins of 10, 20, and 50 chon values.

## II. Status of Currency in South Korea during the period 25 June 50 - 15 Sept 50.

The precipitous departure of the government of the ROK from the capital city of Seoul in June 1950 resulted in the loss to the Communists of the entire Central Bank reserve of some SK Won 60 billion as well as currency plates, paper,

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ink, and an unknown amount of unissued notes of both Korean and US printing. Fiscal authorities of the ROK managed to evacuate some SK Won 4 billion as well as the gold and silver reserve (288 standard bars of gold and 96 bars of silver) into the Pusan beachhead area. In view of the unlimited amount of South Korean currency available to the enemy, an entirely new and distinctive issue of South Korean currency was printed in Japan. This issue, in 100 and 1,000 Won notes, was introduced into the Pusan-Taegu area, without benefit of a formal conversion, at parity during the latter part of July 1950. By 10 September, some 13 billion Won had been exchanged on this "de facto" basis. Formal conversion was carried out in the beachhead area during the period 15 - 22 September, with old notes valued under 100 Won being unaffected. A ceiling of 100,000 Won was placed on the amount convertible by any one household, with subsequent withdrawals from blocked accounts limited to 20,000 Won weekly. Currency circulating in the beachhead on 15 September was in the vicinity of SK Won <sup>6 billion</sup> 40 million.

The official rate of exchange between the new won and the US dollar during the beachhead period was SK Won 1,800 to US \$1.

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### III. Korean Currency Situation since 15 September

#### A. South Korea

The UN breakout of the Pusan beachhead and the recapture of Seoul imposed immediate new currency problems on the ROK. Prior to the reoccupation of South Korea, South Korean officials had estimated that some SK Won 50.5 billion were circulating in the occupied territory. As the UN reoccupation progressed it was discovered that the Communists had printed an additional Won 1.8 billion in SK 100 Won notes and had circulated Won 15 billion in captured SK Won 1,000 notes never previously placed in circulation by the ROK. Additionally, it is known that the Communists also circulated large amounts of the estimated SK Won 60 billion held in the Bank of Chosun vaults and captured in the <sup>first</sup> fall of Seoul. From these admittedly incomplete figures it can be assumed that South Korean currency of all types circulating in occupied South Korea on 15 September was between SK Won 90-130 billion. According to information currently available, UN forces were able to recover only SK Won 180 million of this excess issue over the figure estimated earlier by

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ROK officials. Although the Communist rate of exchange between the North and South Korea Won was established at SK Won 8 to NK Won 1, the North Korean occupiers had seen fit to utilize available South Korean currency and what little North Korean currency circulated was generally given in payment by North Korean soldiers.

Conversion of the old SK Won into printed-in-Japan SK Won (SK Won ~~PL~~) was begun early in October in the liberated areas, and was scheduled for completion late in November. By 17 November, however, only SK Won 19.8 billion had been converted, largely due to the still unsettled conditions in the guerrilla infested southwest. Although the conversion was made at parity, the ROK refused to accept North Korean currency, accepted the Communist-printed SK 100 Won only for deposit, and refused to take responsibility for the Communist-released SK 1,000 Won notes. Each family was allowed to convert into cash only SK Won 20,000 with withdrawal privilege of 50,000 monthly on the balance deposited.

By 30 November, currency in circulation was estimated at SK Won 147 billion or almost three times the pre-invasion level. Outstanding

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purchasing power had expanded to SK Won 265 billion, an increase of almost 75% over pre-invasion purchasing, with 118 billion <sup>(of this)</sup> in savings accounts.

The effect of the North Korean June invasion and the reoccupation of South Korea by the UN contributed greatly to a revival of the inflationary spiral. The revised budget for Fiscal Year 1950 - 51 of SK Won 552.8 billion envisages a deficit of SK Won 80.7 billion, and US financial officials in South Korea believe that the deficit will be much greater. Other indicators of the rapid deterioration of the South Korean Won may be found in the rising value of the US dollar which had reached SK Won 2,500 officially and SK Won 3,700 on the open market by early December. The index of retail prices had risen to 973 by early December 1950, as opposed to 385 in March, 1950.

B. North Korea

The defeat of the North Korean Army in South Korea and the subsequent occupation of much of North Korea by UN forces added the North Korean currency problem to that of the already serious South Korean fiscal situation. No plan, apparently, had been evolved as to what

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medium of exchange advancing UN troops would use in North Korea. During a period of prolonged debate, the UN troops in North Korea took matters into their own hands and employed all varieties of South Korean currency. The initial official decision of the UN Command was to use North Korean currency, but it was soon discovered that insufficient North Korean currency had been captured. Early "de facto" conversion was accomplished at a 1 SK Won to 1 NK Won rate, whereas the respective purchasing power was closer to the Communist-set rate of 3 SK to 1 NK. (This inequitable rate had adverse effect on popular North Korean acceptance of UN control). The final solution agreed on between the ROK, CINCPAC, the US Department of State, and UNCURK in late November 1950 was to accept the "fait accompli" of South Korean currency circulating in North Korea at that time and in the future to apply the same conversion methods as were being followed in South Korea at a rate of 3 SK Won to 1 NK Won. This conversion was scheduled for early December, 1950.

The Chinese counteroffensive and subsequent abandonment of North Korea by UN forces made implementation of the plan impracticable. Information is

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not available as to the amount of South Korean currency presently circulating in North Korea. Prior to the retreat, a 100% increase in basic commodity prices in Pyongyang and Wonsa<sup>W</sup>, however, indicated the influx of South Korean currency.



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Annex A

Types of Currencies used in Korea since 1945

A. South Korea

Prior to August 1945:

Notes and coin of the Bank of Chosen, an official Japanese Government institution.

August 1945 - April 1948:

(a) Notes and coin of the Bank of Chosen, an official Japanese Government institution in Korea.

(b) US Dollars and Military Payment Certificates.

April 1948 - June 1950:

(a) Notes of the Bank of Chosun, the Korean Central Bank.

(b) Coin and small denomination notes of under 100 Won of the Japanese Bank of Chosen.

(c) US Dollars and Military Payment Certificates.

June 1950 - October 1950:

(1) Communist-occupied South Korea:

(a) Notes and coin of the Central Bank of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea).

(b) Notes of the Bank of Chosun, the South Korean Central Bank.

(c) Coins and small currency of the Japanese Bank of Chosen.

(d) Communist issued or newly printed notes of the Bank of Chosun, the South Korean Central Bank.

(2) UN-occupied South Korea:

(a) Notes of the Bank of Chosun, the South Korean Central Bank.

(b) Notes of the Bank of Chosun (Printed in Japan PIJ - distinguishable from former Bank of Chosun notes).

(c) US Dollars and Military Payment Certificates.

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(d) Coin and small currency of the Japanese Bank of Chosen.

October 1950:

(a) Notes of the Bank of Chosun, the South Korean Central Bank (PIJ).

(b) Notes of the Bank of Chosun, the South Korean Central Bank (in process of conversion to PIJ notes).

(c) Coins and small currency of the Japanese Bank of Chosen.

(d) US Dollars and Military Payment Certificates.

**B. North Korea**

Prior to August 1945:

Notes and coin of the Bank of Chosen, an official Japanese Government institution.

August 1945 - December 1947:

(a) Notes and coin of the above-mentioned Bank of Chosen.

(b) Soviet Occupation currency.

December 1947 - May 1949:

(a) Notes of the Central Bank of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK).

(b) Coin and small denomination notes of the Japanese Bank of Chosen.

May 1949 - October 1950:

(a) Notes and coin of the Central Bank of the DPRK.

October 1950 - December 1950:

(a) Notes and coin of the Central Bank of the DPRK.

(b) Notes of the Bank of Chosun, the South Korean Central Bank.

(c) Notes of the Bank of Chosun, the South Korean Central Bank - Japanese printing (PIJ).

(d) Possibly US Dollars and Military Payment Certificates were circulated in very small quantities.

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December 1950:

Presumably notes and coins of the Central Bank of the DPRK will again be the only acceptable currency in North Korea. Chinese Communist troops in Korea have been reported as paying for goods with handwritten promissory notes redeemable by the North Korean government. No other reports have been received as to the types and quantity of currency utilized by the Chinese Communists.

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**FROM:**

I/IS

**NO.**

36182

**DATE**

22 November 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. Chief, D/Pub, ORR ATTN: [REDACTED]					D/FE [REDACTED] 11/22/50  1P-199  25X1A
2. 25X1A					
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PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

Editorial Review

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

Note: This cover sheet must accompany the draft under review at all times within D/Pub. When the draft is returned to the producing division, the date will be recorded, proper entry made in the log, and the cover sheet and attachments returned to the file. When the draft is again received in D/Pub, the cover sheet will be attached with notation of the date on it and in the log. The Coordination and Production Branch should be advised of the above transactions.

No drafts should be accepted by the Editors without an Editorial Review cover sheet.

Editors will ordinarily advise the producing division of the results of their initial review within 48 hours of receipt of the draft.

Project: IP-199

acting Chief  
Received from: D/Rgl

Subject: Overseas Chinese Personalities and  
Organizations in Selected Cities of  
Southeast Asia

Date: 22 December 1950

Deadline for editing:

Remarks:

Reviewed in D/Pub by:

Date

(1) Ja (2) \_\_\_\_\_ (3) \_\_\_\_\_

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Received in D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_

Results of initial review communicated to  
Division:

Returned to Division: \_\_\_\_\_  
Received in D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Time: \_\_\_\_\_ By: \_\_\_\_\_

Summary of Initial Review (use reverse side if necessary):

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Final Draft approved by Dir \_\_\_\_\_

Pub. Ja

Date: 12/28/50

Chief, D/Pub: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Final Revision (after \_\_\_\_\_) approved by

Division:

Coordinator:

D/Pub:

Date:

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V. HANOI (cont'd)

B. Organizations

1. GROUPEMENT ADMINISTRATIF CHINOIS REGIONAL (GACRR) OF HANOI

The GACRR in Hanoi is a combined organization of the two GACH (Cantonese and Fukienese). It, with the GACH of Haiphong, is the most dynamic pro-Nationalist organization in North Vietnam. It played a leading role in conducting the celebration of the 1950 Double Ten. It is, however, reportedly infiltrated by Communists. There is no Chamber of Commerce.

C. Education

No pertinent information concerning the current educational picture is available.

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VI. HAIKENG (cont'd)

B. Organizations (cont'd)

2. GRUPAMENT ADMINISTRATIF CHINOIS REGIONAL de Canton

3. GRUPAMENT ADMINISTRATIF CHINOIS REGIONAL de Fukien

(There is no combined organization corresponding to the GACRS of Hanoi.)

4. KANG FENG JIH PAO

Formerly subsidized by the KMT, it uses much USIS material.

C. Education

No pertinent information concerning the current educational picture is available.

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
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#### B. Organizations

As in other Southeast Asian Chinese communities, the Rangoon Chinese are highly sensitive to developments which affect the prestige of the Peiping regime or of the Western powers. By and large they are reluctant openly to commit themselves politically. The Chinese Communists have established a dominant position in the Rangoon Chinese community and control most of the City's Chinese newspapers, schools and cultural organisations. In this situation, however, the only genuine converts to Communism appear to be among the student element. Furthermore, a number of anti-Communist groups are reported as still functioning. Of these groups, little is known concerning organisation, leadership or membership. In fact, the paucity of information regarding the Rangoon Chinese in

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general does not permit more than a surface evaluation of the current political position of those organizations which cannot be identified as outright Communist or Communist-oriented.

1. Kuomintang (KMT) Remnants

Despite the generally low repute in which the KMT apparently is held by the bulk of Chinese in Rangoon, the remnant KMT organization in Rangoon constitutes about the only available rallying point for local anti-Communist Chinese. Since the establishment of the Communist regime in China, the first manifestation of lingering pro-KMT sentiment among Rangoon Chinese occurred in the 10 October (Double Tenth Day) celebrations in which pro-KMT elements led public demonstrations involving some seventy local organizations (unidentified) and an estimated 4,000 persons. This resurgence of pro-KMT sentiment apparently was related to the late summer UN successes in Korea.

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Close observers appear to feel that given hope, competent local leadership, and sufficient autonomy from Taiwan, the Rangoon KMT could again become an important center of anti-Communist activity.

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## 2. The Freedom Pao

The only avowedly anti-Communist, anti-Peiping Chinese paper in Burma. Presently a tabloid published weekly, its backers hope to expand it into a full-sized daily newspaper. Of the Rs 100,000 (\$21,000) capital needed for such an undertaking, Rs 80,000 have already been pledged. The first edition of 3,000 copies were completely sold out, which is a circulation (if it can be maintained) greater than either of the pro-Communist papers. Plans are also being laid to disseminate the paper into the hinterland, where over 100 agents are said to have been lined up for distribution purposes.

The following organizations are included as possibly useful information. There is negligible data available concerning their political orientation or background.

## 3. The Hakka Community

See comments with regard to [REDACTED]

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## 4. Chekiang-Kiangsi Association

Nothing is known about this organization except that it is led by [REDACTED]

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## 5. Chinese Youth National Military Arts Society

See comments regarding [REDACTED]

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## 6. Chinese Christian groups

The Chinese Methodist Church in Rangoon has been mentioned above. While there is no substantiating evidence, it is possible that other Christian groups exist among the Chinese in Rangoon.

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### C. Education

There are over 200 Chinese primary and middle schools in Burma, of which 28 are located in Rangoon. There is no reason to believe that they have differed from the usual Chinese educational pattern. These schools have not been subject to any Government regulations whatsoever. The great majority of these schools are now controlled by the Communists, and have adopted a completely pro-Communist curriculum. Communist instructors have been infiltrating into Burma for sometime, under the auspices of the Chinese Democratic League, and have spread throughout the local Chinese educational system.

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I/19.

NO.

35331

DATE

29 Nov. 50

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. CG D/Pob, ORP. [REDACTED]					IP-200 D/LA 11/30/50
2. 25X1A					
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